Modeling Single-Peakedness for Votes with Ties by Fitzsimmons, Zack & Hemaspaandra, Edith
ar
X
iv
:1
60
4.
08
19
1v
2 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
8 J
un
 20
16
Modeling Single-Peakedness for Votes with Ties
Zack Fitzsimmons
College of Computing and Inf. Sciences
Rochester Inst. of Technology
Rochester, NY 14623
Edith Hemaspaandra
Dept. of Computer Science
Rochester Inst. of Technology
Rochester, NY 14623
June 18, 2016
Abstract
Single-peakedness is one of the most important and well-known domain restrictions on preferences.
The computational study of single-peaked electorates has largely been restricted to elections with tie-free
votes, and recent work that studies the computational complexity of manipulative attacks for single-peaked
elections for votes with ties has been restricted to nonstandard models of single-peaked preferences for
top orders. We study the computational complexity of manipulation for votes with ties for the standard
model of single-peaked preferences and for single-plateaued preferences. We show that these models avoid
the anomalous complexity behavior exhibited by the other models. We also state a surprising result on the
relation between the societal axis and the complexity of manipulation for single-peaked preferences.
1 Introduction
Elections are a general and widely used framework for preference aggregation in human and artificial in-
telligence applications. An important negative result from social choice theory, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite
Theorem [25, 37], states that every reasonable election system is manipulable. However, even though every
election system is manipulable, it may be computationally infeasible to determine how to manipulate the
outcome.
Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [2] introduced the computational study of the manipulation problem and
this began an exciting line of research that explores the computational complexity of different manipulative
attacks on elections (see, e.g., [17]).
The notion of single-peaked preferences introduced by Black [5] is the most important restriction on
preferences from political science and economics and is naturally an important case to consider computa-
tionally. Single-peakedness models the preferences of a collection of voters with respect to a given axis (a
total ordering of the candidates). Each voter in a single-peaked election has a single most-preferred candi-
date (peak) on the axis and the farther candidates are to the left/right from her peak the less preferred they
are. Single-plateauedness extends this to model when each voter has multiple most-preferred candidates that
appear sequentially on the axis, but are otherwise single-peaked [6].
This standard model of single-peaked preferences has many desirable social-choice properties. When
the voters in an election are single-peaked, the majority relation is transitive [5] and there exist voting rules
that are strategy-proof [34] (i.e., a voter cannot misrepresent her preferences to achieve a personally better
outcome). Single-peakedness for total orders can also have an effect on the complexity of many different
election attack problems when compared to the general case. The complexity of manipulative attacks often
decreases when the voters in an election are single-peaked [19, 7], and the winner problems for Kemeny,
Dodgson, and Young elections are in P when they are Θp2-complete in general [27, 28, 36].
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Most of the abovementioned research on the computational complexity of manipulation of elections, both
for the general case and for single-peaked electorates, has been limited to the assumption that voters have tie-
free votes. In many real-world scenarios voters have votes with ties, and this is seen in the online repository
PREFLIB [31] that contains several different preference datasets that contain ties. There are also election
systems defined for votes with ties, e.g., the Kemeny rule and the Schulze rule [29, 38].
Recent work considers the complexity of manipulation for top-order votes (votes where all of the ties are
between candidates ranked last) [35, 32]. Fitzsimmons and Hemaspaandra [24] considered the complexity
of manipulation, control, and bribery for more general votes with ties, and also the case of manipulation for
a nonstandard model of single-peakedness for top-order votes. Menon and Larson [33] later examined the
complexity of manipulation and bribery for an equivalent (for top orders) model of single-peakedness.
Fitzsimmons and Hemaspaandra [24] use the model of possibly single-peaked preferences from Lack-
ner [30] where a preference profile of votes with ties is said to be single-peaked with respect to an axis if
the votes can be extended to tie-free votes that are single-peaked with respect to the same axis. Menon and
Larson [33] use a similar model for top orders that they state is essentially the model of single-peaked prefer-
ences with outside options [9]. Both Fitzsimmons and Hemaspaandra [24] and Menon and Larson [33] find
that these notions of single-peakedness exhibit anomalous computational behavior where the complexity of
manipulation can increase when compared with the case of single-peaked total orders.
We are the first to study the computational complexity of manipulation for the standard model of single-
peaked preferences for votes with ties, and for single-plateaued preferences for votes with ties. In contrast
to the recent related work using other models of single-peakedness with ties, we find that the complexity
of weighted manipulation for m-candidate scoring rules and for m-candidate Copelandα elections for all
0≤α < 1 does not increase when compared to the cases of single-peaked total orders, and that the complexity
of weighted manipulation does not increase with respect to the general case of elimination veto elections. We
also compare the social choice properties of these different models, and state a surprising result on the relation
between the societal axis and the complexity of manipulation for single-peaked preferences.
2 Preliminaries
An election consists of a finite set of candidates C and a finite collection of voters V . We will sometimes refer
to this collection of voters as a preference profile. An election system E is a mapping from an election to a set
of winners, which can be any subset of the candidate set (the nonunique winner model, our standard model),
or at most a single candidate (the unique winner model).
Each voter in an election has a corresponding vote (or preference order) over the set of candidates. This
is often assumed to be a total order, i.e., a strict ordering of the candidates from most to least preferred.
Formally, a total order is a complete, reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric binary relation. We use “>” to
denote strict preference between two candidates.
Similarly, a weak order is a total order without antisymmetry, so each voter can rank candidates as tied
(which we will sometimes refer to as indifference) as long as their ties are transitive. We use “∼” to denote a
tie between two candidates. A bottom order is a weak order where all ties are between top-ranked candidates
and a top order is a weak order where all ties are between bottom-ranked candidates. Notice that a total order
is a weak order, a top order, and a bottom order, that a top order is a weak order, and that a bottom order is a
weak order. Throughout this paper we will sometimes refer to weak orders as votes with ties.
For some of our results we consider weighted elections, where each voter has an associated positive
integral weight and a voter with weight w counts as w unweighted voters all voting the same.
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2.1 Election System Definitions
Our election systems include scoring rules, elimination veto, and Copelandα . We define each below and the
extensions we use to properly consider votes with ties.
Given an election with m candidates, a scoring rule assigns scores to the candidates using its correspond-
ing m-candidate scoring vector of the form α = 〈α1,α2, . . . ,αm〉 where α1 ≥ α2 ≥ ·· · ≥ αm and each αi ∈N.
So, when the preferences of a voter are a total order, the candidate ranked in position i receives a score of
αi from that voter. Below we present examples of scoring rules and their corresponding m-candidate scoring
vector.
Plurality: with scoring vector 〈1,0, . . . ,0〉.
Veto: with scoring vector 〈1,1, . . . ,1,0〉.
Borda: with scoring vector 〈m− 1,m− 2, . . . ,1,0〉.
Triviality: with scoring vector 〈0,0, . . . ,0〉.
To use a scoring rule to determine the outcome of an election containing votes with ties we must extend
the above definition of scoring rules. We use the definitions of scoring-rule extensions for weak orders from
our previous work [24], which generalize the extensions introduced for top orders from Baumeister et al. [4]
and from Narodytska and Walsh [35] which in turn generalizes the extensions used by Emerson [13] for
Borda.
Given a weak-order vote, we can write it as G1 > G2 > · · ·> Gr, where each Gi is a set of tied candidates,
(so in the case of a total order vote each Gi is a singleton). For each Gi, let ki = ∑i−1j=1 ‖G j‖ be the number
of candidates strictly preferred to the candidates in Gi. We now state the definitions of each of the four
extensions. In Example 1 we present an example of how a given weak-order vote is scored using Borda and
each of the scoring-rule extensions.
Min: each candidate in Gi receives a score of αki+‖Gi‖.
Max: each candidate in Gi receives a score of αki+1.
Round down: each candidate in Gi receives a score of αm−r+i.
Average: each candidate in Gi receives a score of (∑ki+‖Gi‖j=ki+1 α j)/‖Gi‖.
For top orders the scoring-rule extensions min, round down, and average are the same as round up, round
down, and average used in the work by Menon and Larson [33].
Example 1 Given the candidate set {a,b,c,d,e} and the weak order vote (a ∼ b > c ∼ d > e) we show
the scores assigned to each candidate using Borda and each of our extensions. We can write the vote as
{a,b}> {c,d}> {e}, so G1 = {a,b}, G2 = {c,d}, and G3 = {e}, and k1 = 0, k2 = 2, and k3 = 4.
Recall that for total orders, the scoring vector for 5-candidate Borda is 〈4,3,2,1,0〉.
Borda using min: score(a) = score(b) = 3, score(c) = score(d) = 1, and score(e) = 0.
Borda using max: score(a) = score(b) = 4, score(c) = score(d) = 2, and score(e) = 0.
Borda using round down: score(a) = score(b) = 2, score(c) = score(d) = 1, and score(e) = 0.
Borda using average: score(a) = score(b) = 3.5, score(c) = score(d) = 1.5, and score(e) = 0.
For elimination veto for total orders, the veto scoring rule is used, the candidate with the lowest score is
eliminated, and the rule is repeated on the remaining votes restricted to the remaining candidates until there
is one candidate left [10]. We break ties lexicographically, and for comparison with related work our results
for elimination veto use the unique winner model, and for votes with ties we use the min extension.
Pairwise election systems are one of the most natural cases for considering votes with ties. Copelandα is
an important and well-known election system that is defined using pairwise comparisons between candidates.
In a Copelandα election each candidate receives one point for each pairwise majority election with each other
candidate she wins and α points for each tie (where α ∈Q and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1). For votes with ties we follow the
obvious extension also used by Baumeister et al. [4] and Narodytska and Walsh [35].
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For Copelandα elections it will sometimes be easier to refer to the induced majority graph of an election.
Given an election (C,V ) its induced majority graph is constructed as follows. Each vertex in the induced
majority graph corresponds to a candidate in C, and for all candidates a,b ∈C if a > b by majority then there
is an edge from a to b in the induced majority graph. We also will refer to the weighted majority graph of an
election, where each edge from a to b in the induced majority graph is labeled with the difference between
the number of voters that state a > b and the number of voters that state b > a.
2.2 Election Problems
The computational study of the manipulation of elections was introduced by Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [2],
and Conitzer, Sandholm, and Lang [11] extended this to the case for weighted voters and a coalition of
manipulators. We define the constructive weighted coalitional manipulation (CWCM) problem below.
Name: E -CWCM
Given: a set of candidates C, a collection of nonmanipulative voters S, a collection of manipulative voters T ,
and a preferred candidate p ∈C.
Question: Does there exist a way to set the votes of T such that p is a winner of (C,S∪T ) under election
system E ?
For the case of CWCM for each of our models of single-peaked preferences we follow the model intro-
duced by Walsh [39] where the societal axis is given as part of the input to the problem and the manipulators
must state votes that are single-peaked with respect to this axis (for the corresponding model of single-
peakedness). (See Section 3 for all of the definitions of single-peaked preferences that we use.)
2.3 Computational Complexity
For our NP-completeness results we will use the following well-known NP-complete problem.
Name: Partition
Given: Given a collection of t positive integers k1, . . . ,kt such that ∑ti=1 ki = 2K.
Question: Does there exist a partition of k1, . . . ,kt into two subcollections A and B such that ∑A = ∑B = K?
3 Models of Single-Peaked Preferences
We consider four important models of single-peaked preferences for votes with ties. For the following defi-
nitions, for a given axis L (a total ordering of the candidates) and a given preference order v, we say that v
is strictly increasing (decreasing) along a segment of L if each candidate is preferred to the candidate on its
left (right) with respect to L. In Figure 1 we present an example of each of the four models of single-peaked
preferences, and in Figure 2 we show how the four models relate to each other. We now give the definition of
the standard model of single-peakedness from Black [5].
Definition 1 Given a preference profile V of weak orders over a set of candidates C, V is single-peaked with
respect to a total ordering of the candidates L (an axis) if for each voter v ∈ V, L can be split into three
segments X, Y , and Z (X and Z can each be empty) such that Y contains only the most preferred candidate of
v, v is strictly increasing along X and v is strictly decreasing along Z.
Observe that for a preference profile of votes with ties to be single-peaked with respect to an axis, each
voter can have a tie between at most two candidates at each position in her preference order since the candi-
dates must each appear on separate sides of her peak. Otherwise the preference order would not be strictly
increasing/decreasing along the given axis.
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The model of single-plateaued preferences extends single-peakedness by allowing voters to have multiple
most preferred candidates (an indifference plateau) [6]. This is defined by extending Definition 1 so that Y
can contain multiple candidates.
Lackner [30] recently introduced another extension to single-peaked preferences, which we refer to as
“possibly single-peaked preferences” throughout this paper. A preference profile is possibly single-peaked
with respect to a given axis if there exists an extension of each preference order to a total order such that the
new preference profile of total orders is single-peaked. This can be stated without referring to extensions, for
votes with ties, in the following way.
Definition 2 Given a preference profile V of weak orders over a set of candidates C, V is possibly single-
peaked with respect to a total ordering of the candidates L (an axis) if for each voter v∈V, L can be split into
three segments X, Y , and Z (X and Z can each be empty) such that Y contains the most preferred candidates
of v, v is weakly increasing along X and v is weakly decreasing along Z.
Notice that the above definition extends single-plateauedness to allow for multiple indifference plateaus
on either side of the peak. So for votes with ties, possibly single-peaked preferences model when voters have
weakly increasing and then weakly decreasing or only weakly increasing/decreasing preferences along an
axis.
Another generalization of single-peaked preferences for votes with ties was introduced by Cantala [9]:
the model of single-peaked preferences with outside options. When preferences satisfy this restriction with
respect to a given axis, each voter has a segment of the axis where they have single-peaked preferences
and candidates appearing outside of this segment on the axis are strictly less preferred and the voter is tied
between them. Similar to how single-plateaued preferences extend the standard single-peaked model to allow
voters to state multiple most preferred candidates, single-peaked preferences with outside options extends the
standard model to allow voters to state multiple least preferred candidates.
Definition 3 Given a preference profile V of weak orders over a set of candidates C, V is single-peaked with
outside options with respect to a total ordering of the candidates L (an axis) if for each voter v ∈V, L can be
split into five segments O1, X, Y , Z, and O2 (O1, X, Z, and O2 can each be empty) such that Y contains only
the most preferred candidate of v, v is strictly increasing along X and v is strictly decreasing along Z, for all
candidates a∈ X ∪Y ∪Z and b∈O1∪O2, v states a > b, and for all candidates x,y ∈O1∪O2, v states x ∼ y.
Menon and Larson [33] state that the model of single-peakedness for top orders that they use is similar to
single-peaked preferences with outside options. It is clear from their paper that for top orders these models
are the same. So for the remainder of the paper we will refer to the model used by Menon and Larson [33] as
“single-peaked preferences with outside options for top orders.”
3.1 Social Choice Properties
We now state some general observations on single-peaked preferences with ties, including how the models
relate to each other, as well as their social-choice properties.
It is easy to see that for total-order preferences each of the four models of single-peakedness with ties
that we consider are equivalent. In Figure 2 we show how each model relates for weak orders, top orders, and
bottom orders.
Given a preference profile of votes it is natural to ask how to determine if an axis exists such that the profile
satisfies one of the above restrictions. This is referred to as the consistency problem for a restriction. Bartholdi
and Trick [3] showed that single-peaked consistency for total orders can be determined in polynomial time
(i.e., is in P), and Fitzsimmons [23] extended this result to show that single-peaked, single-plateaued, and
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Figure 1: Given the axis L = a < b < c < d < e < f < g, the solid line is the single-peaked order (e > d > c∼
f > b > a > g), the dashed line is the single-plateaued order (b ∼ c > d > e > f > g > a), the dashed-dotted
line is the single-peaked with outside options order (d > c ∼ e > a ∼ b ∼ f ∼ g), and the dotted line is the
possibly single-peaked order ( f ∼ g > e > d ∼ c > b > a). See Figure 2 for the relationships between the
four models.
OO−Single−Peaked Single−Plateaued
Single−Peaked
Poss−Single−Peaked
(a) Relationship for weak orders
OO−Single−Peaked
Single−PlateauedSingle−Peaked
Poss−Single−Peaked
(b) Relationship for top orders
Single−Plateaued
OO−Single−PeakedSingle−Peaked
Poss−Single−Peaked
(c) Relationship for bottom orders
Figure 2: Relationships between the four models of single-peaked preferences for different types of votes with
ties, where A → B indicates that a preference profile satisfying model A also satisfies model B. OO-Single-
Peaked and Poss-Single-Peaked refer to Single-Peaked with Outside Options and Possibly Single-Peaked
respectively.
possibly single-peaked consistency for weak orders is in P. This leaves the consistency problem for single-
peaked preferences with outside options, which we will now show to be in P.
It is easy to see that given a preference profile of top orders, it is single-peaked with outside options if and
only if it is possibly single-peaked. So it is immediate from the result by Lackner [30] that shows that possibly
single-peaked consistency for top orders is in P, that the consistency problem for single-peaked preferences
with outside options for top orders is in P. For weak orders the construction used to show that single-peaked
consistency for weak orders is in P by Fitzsimmons [23] can be adapted to hold for the case of single-peaked
preferences with outside options for weak orders, so this consistency problem is also in P.
Theorem 1 Given a preference profile V of weak orders it can be determined in polynomial time if there
exists an axis L such that V is single-peaked with outside options with respect to L.
One of the most well-known and desirable properties of an election with single-peaked preferences is
that there exists a transitive majority relation [5]. A majority relation is transitive if for all distinct candidates
a,b,c ∈C if a > b and b > c by majority then a > c by majority. When the majority relation is transitive then
candidates that beat-or-tie every other candidate by majority exist and they are denoted the weak Condorcet
winners. This also holds when the voters have single-plateaued preferences [6].
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It is not the case that the majority relation is transitive when preferences in an election are single-peaked
with outside options or are possibly single-peaked. Fitzsimmons [23] points out that for possibly single-
peakedness this was implicitly shown in an entry of Table 9.1 in Fishburn [22], where a preference profile
of top orders that violates single-peaked preferences was described that does not have a transitive majority
relation, and this profile is possibly single-peaked (and single-peaked with outside options). Cantala also pro-
vides an example of a profile that is single-peaked with outside options that does not have a weak Condorcet
winner, and so does not have a transitive majority relation [9].
4 Computational Results
For total-order preferences, weighted manipulation for any fixed number of candidates is known to be
NP-complete for every scoring rule that is not isomorphic to plurality or triviality [26]. For single-peaked
total orders, Faliszewski et al. [19] completely characterized the complexity of weighted manipulation for
3-candidate scoring rules and this result was generalized by Brandt et al. [7] for any fixed number of can-
didates. These results both showed that the complexity of weighted manipulation for scoring rules often
decreases when voters have single-peaked total orders.
For top-order preferences, dichotomy theorems for 3-candidate weighted manipulation for scoring rules
using round down, min, and average were shown by Menon and Larson for the general case [32] and for the
case of single-peaked preferences with outside options for top orders [33]. Menon and Larson [33] found
that, counterintuitively, the complexity of weighted manipulation for single-peaked preferences with outside
options often increases when moving from total orders to top orders. We also mention that for the scoring-
rule extension max, we earlier found that the complexity of 3-candidate weighted manipulation for Borda
increases for possibly single-peaked preferences when moving from total orders to top orders [24].
We show that for the standard model of single-peakedness and for single-plateauedness that the complex-
ity of weighted manipulation for m-candidate scoring rules using max, min, round down, and average does
not increase when moving from total orders to top orders, bottom orders, or weak orders.
The following results are close analogs to the case for single-peaked total orders due to Brandt et al. [7].
Lemma 2 If p can be made a winner by a manipulation of top-order, bottom-order, or weak-order votes
that are single-peaked, single-plateaued, possibly single-peaked, or single-peaked with outside options for a
scoring rule using max, min, round down, or average, then p can be made a winner by a manipulation (of the
same type) in which all manipulators rank p uniquely first.
Proof. Suppose that a manipulator has a vote of the form (Awo > P > B1 > · · ·> Bℓ) where Awo is a weak
order over A (where A can be empty), ℓ≥ 0, each of P,B1, . . . ,Bℓ are nonempty groups of tied candidates, and
p ∈ P. We have the following two cases.
Case 1: If all of the candidates in P appear on the same side of the candidates in A with respect to the axis
(or A is empty), then we can change the vote of the manipulator to p > (P−{p})to > Ato > B1 >
· · · > Bℓ where (P−{p})to and Ato are total orders such that the vote satisfies the given notion of
single-peakedness with ties with respect to the axis.
Case 2: Otherwise, we let P′ be the candidates to the left of A and P′′ be the candidates to the right of A with
respect to the axis. Without loss of generality let p∈ P′. We can then change the vote of the manipulator
to p > (P′−{p})to > Ato > P′′to > B1 > · · ·> Bℓ.
Notice that in all of the above cases, for all candidates c ∈ C−{p} that score(p)− score(c) does not
decrease, regardless of which scoring-rule extension is used. So if p is a winner with the initial vote, p is still
a winner in the vote that ranks p uniquely first. ❑
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Theorem 3 Let α = 〈α1,α2, . . . ,αm〉 be a scoring vector. If α-CWCM is in P for single-peaked total orders,
then α-CWCM is in P for single-peaked and single-plateaued top orders, bottom orders, and weak orders for
all our scoring rule extensions.
Proof. If the societal axis has p in the leftmost or rightmost position, then, by Lemma 2, we can assume
that all manipulators rank p uniquely first. There is exactly one such single-peaked or single-plateaued vote
with ties, namely to rank p first and strictly rank the remaining candidates according to their position on the
axis.
So, let the societal axis be am1L · · ·La1LpLb1L · · ·Lbm2 .
We first consider the P cases for single-peaked total orders described in Lemma 6.6 of Brandt et al. [7]
where for all i, j > 1 such that i+ j ≤ m+ 1 it holds that (α1 −αi)(α1 −α j)≤ (αi −αi+1)(α j −α j+1).
The crucial observation in the proof of this lemma is that for every set of single-peaked total order votes
S, we are in one of the following two cases:
1. For all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m1, scoreS(ai)≤ scoreS(p).
2. For all i, 1 ≤ i ≤ m2, scoreS(bi)≤ scoreS(p).
We will show that this is also the case for single-peaked and single-plateaued orders with ties. This then
implies that the optimal vote for all manipulators is p > b1 > · · · > bm2 > a1 > · · · > am1 (in case 1) or
p > a1 > · · ·> am1 > b1 > · · ·> bm2 (in case 2).
For the sake of contradiction let S be a collection of nonmanipulators and i1 and i2 be integers such that
1 < i1 ≤ m1 + 1 and 1 < i2 ≤ m2 + 1 such that scoreS(ai1)> scoreS(p) and scoreS(bi2)> scoreS(p).
We now create an Ŝ such that scoreŜ(ai1) > scoreŜ(p) and scoreŜ(bi2) > scoreŜ(p) and the argument in
the proof of Lemma 6.6 in Brandt et al. [7] still holds.
• First, remove from S all voters that have p tied for first. Notice that if we remove all votes with p tied
for first from S then score(p) does not increase and neither score(ai1) nor score(bi2) decreases. So we
can assume that p is never tied for first in a vote (although this does not mean that other candidates
cannot be tied for first in a vote when we are in the single-plateaued case).
• We know that p is not tied for first (part of an indifference plateau), so p is tied with at most one other
candidate in each vote. So in every vote break the tie against p. Notice that this can lower only the score
of p regardless of whether we are using the min, max, round down, or average scoring-rule extension.
Let ℓi be the total weight of the voters in Ŝ that rank some candidate in {a1, . . . ,am1} first and p in the
position of αi (in every extension other than round down this means that p is ranked ith; for round down we
mean that p is ranked in the αi group (i.e., p is followed by m− i groups). Using a similar argument to the
proof of Lemma 6.6 from Brandt et al. [7] with Ŝ as described above we can reach a contradiction.
We now present the remaining P cases, which can be seen as the with-ties analog of the P cases of
Lemma 6.7 from Brandt et al. [7].
We examine each of the cases individually. For convenience, we normalize the scoring vector so that
αm = 0.
If α2 = 0 then clearly the optimal action for the manipulators is to vote a total order with p uniquely first
and the remaining candidates ranked arbitrarily such that the vote is single-peaked.
If α1 = α⌊m−12 ⌋+2, then, as pointed out in [7], Lemma 6.6 applies, which has been handled above.
The last P-time case is that α1 ≤ 2α2, α1 > α2 > 0, and α2 = αm−1.
Notice that when the votes are single-peaked or when they are single-plateaued then am1 and bm2 are the
only candidates that can occur last in a vote, either uniquely or tied (except for the case where all candidates
are tied, but we can easily ignore these votes since they do not change the relative scores between candidates).
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Since we know from Lemma 2 that all of the manipulators can put p strictly ranked first, we can have the
following manipulator votes.
• p > · · ·> a.
• p > · · ·> b.
• p > · · ·> a ∼ b.
Notice that for all votes with p first that score(p)≥ α2.
For all votes, score(am1)= 0 or score(bm2)= 0, or am1 and bm2 are tied for last, in which case score(am1)+
score(bm2)≤ 2α2 (the worst case occurs with max where they each receive a score of αm−1).
So, scoreS(am1)+scoreS(bm2)≤ 2scoreS(p). If scoreS(am1)≤ scoreS(p), p > a1 > · · ·> am1 > b1 > · · ·>
bm2 is the optimal manipulator vote. Otherwise, scoreS(bm2)≤ scoreS(p) and p > b1 > · · ·> bm2 > a1 > · · ·>
am1 is the optimal manipulator vote.
We have proven that the above cases hold for single-peaked and for single-plateaued weak orders, and
it is clear that the case for single-peaked bottom orders follows from the case of single-peaked total orders
(since they are equivalent) and it is also clear how to adapt the above arguments to hold for single-peaked top
orders, and for single-plateaued top orders and bottom orders. ❑
The most surprising result in the work by Menon and Larson [33] was that the complexity of 3-candidate
CWCM for elimination veto for single-peaked preferences with outside options for top orders using min is
NP-complete, whereas for single-peaked total orders [33] and even for total orders in the general case [10] it
is in P.
Theorem 4 [10] m-candidate elimination veto CWCM for total orders is in P in the unique-winner model.
Theorem 5 [33] m-candidate elimination veto CWCM for single-peaked total orders is in P in the unique-
winner model.
Theorem 6 [33] 3-candidate elimination veto CWCM for top orders that are single-peaked with outside
options is NP-complete in the unique-winner model.
Menon and Larson [33] state this case as a counterexample to the conjecture by Faliszewski et al. [19],
which states that the complexity for a natural election system will not increase when moving from the general
case to the single-peaked case. (Though Menon and Larson do qualify that the conjecture from Faliszewski
et al. concerned total orders.) However, for the standard model of single-peaked preferences and for single-
plateaued preferences, elimination veto CWCM for top orders, bottom orders, and weak orders using min
is in P for any fixed number of candidates, thus the counterexample crucially relies on using a nonstandard
definition.
Theorem 7 m-candidate elimination veto CWCM for single-peaked and for single-plateaued top orders,
bottom orders, and weak orders using min is in P in the unique-winner model.
Proof. The proof of this theorem follows from a similar argument to the proof of the theorem for single-
peaked total orders from Menon and Larson [33]. This is because that proof follows from the fact that for
total orders the candidate eliminated after each round is on the leftmost or rightmost location of the axis, and
the reverse of an elimination order is single-peaked with respect to the axis. It is easy to see that both of these
statements also hold for single-peaked votes with ties, since the only candidates that can be vetoed in each
round are still the leftmost and rightmost candidates on the axis. For single-plateaued preferences it is possible
for voters with an indifference plateaued to veto more than two candidates (after all of the candidates ranked
9
below their indifference plateau have been eliminated), but it is easy to see that these votes do not affect which
candidate is eliminated since all of the remaining candidates are vetoed by such voters. It is also clear that
Lemma 12 from Coleman and Teague [10] still holds which states that if there exists a collection of votes that
can induce an elimination order, then this elimination order can be induced by all of the manipulators voting
the reverse of the elimination order. So since we know that the reverse of an elimination order is single-peaked
with respect to the axis, and that there are only polynomially many possible elimination orders with p first,
the manipulators simply try each elimination order with p first.
Since the elimination order is always a total order, the above argument clearly holds for single-peaked
and single-plateaued top orders, bottom orders, and weak orders. ❑
It is known that 3-candidate Copelandα CWCM for all rational α ∈ [0,1) is NP-complete for total orders
in the nonunique-winner model [20], and when α = 1 (also known as Llull) CWCM is in P for m ≤ 4 [20, 21]
and the cases for m≥ 5 remain open. Fitzsimmons and Hemaspaandra [24] showed that the NP-completeness
of the 3-candidate case holds for top orders, bottom orders, and weak orders, and Menon and Larson [32]
independently showed the top-order case. Fitzsimmons and Hemaspaandra [24] also showed that 3-candidate
Llull CWCM is in P for top orders, bottom orders, and weak orders.
Recall that weak Condorcet winners always exist when preferences are single-peaked with ties, and when
they are single-plateaued. So the results that Llull CWCM for single-peaked total orders is in P from Brandt
et al. [7] also holds for the case of single-peaked and single-plateaued top orders, bottom orders, and weak
orders.
Copelandα for α ∈ [0,1) was shown to be in P by Yang [40] for single-peaked total orders.
Theorem 8 [40] Copelandα CWCM for α ∈ [0,1) is in P for single-peaked total orders.
In contrast, for top orders that are single-peaked with outside options, it is NP-complete even for three
candidates [33].
Theorem 9 [33] 3-candidate Copelandα CWCM for α ∈ [0,1) is NP-complete for top orders that are single-
peaked with outside options.
For single-peaked and single-plateaued weak orders, bottom orders, and top orders we again inherit the
behavior of single-peaked total orders.
Theorem 10 Copelandα CWCM for α ∈ [0,1) is in P for single-peaked and single-plateaued top orders,
bottom orders, and weak orders.
Proof. Let L be our axis. Consider a set of nonmanipulators with single-plateaued weak orders. Replace
each nonmanipulator v of weight w with two nonmanipulators v1 and v2 of weight w. The first nonmanipulator
breaks the ties in the vote in increasing order of L and the second nonmanipulator breaks the ties in the vote
in decreasing order of L, i.e., if a ∼v b and aLb, then a >v1 b and b >v2 a. Note that v1 and v2 are single-
peaked total orders and that the weighted majority graph induced by the nonmanipulators after replacement
can be obtained from the weighted majority graph induced by the original nonmanipulators by multiplying
each weight in the graph by 2. When we also multiply the manipulator weights by 2, we have an equivalent
Copelandα CWCM problem, where all nonmanipulators are single-peaked total orders and all manipulators
have even weight.
Suppose p can be made a winner by having the manipulators cast single-plateaued votes with ties. Now
replace each manipulator of weight 2w by two weight-w manipulators. The first manipulator breaks the ties
in the vote in increasing order of L and the second manipulator breaks the ties in the vote in decreasing order
of L. Now the replaced manipulator votes are single-peaked total orders and p is still a winner. We need the
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following fact from the proof of Theorem 8: if p can be made a winner in the single-peaked total order case,
then p can be made a winner by having all manipulators cast the same P-time computable vote. It follows
that p can be made a winner by having all replaced manipulators cast the same single-peaked total order
vote. But then p can be made a winner by having all original manipulators cast the same single-peaked total
order vote. Since this vote is P-time computable, it follows that Copelandα CWCM for α ∈ [0,1) is in P for
single-plateaued weak orders, and this also holds for single-peaked weak orders since every single-peaked
profile of weak orders is also single-plateaued.
It is clear to see that similar arguments hold for single-peaked top orders, and for single-plateaued top
orders and bottom orders. The case for single-peaked bottom orders follows from the case for single-peaked
total orders. ❑
4.1 Societal-Axis Results
Recall from Lemma 2 that for all our single-peaked models and all our scoring rule extensions, we can assume
that all manipulators rank p uniquely first. When given an axis where the preferred candidate is in the leftmost
or rightmost location, there is exactly one single-peaked total order vote that puts p first, namely, p followed
by the remaining candidates on the axis in order. This is also the case for single-peaked and single-plateaued
orders with ties, since p is ranked uniquely first and no two candidates can be tied on the same side of the
peak. It follows that the weighted manipulation problems for scoring rules for single-peaked total orders and
single-peaked and single-plateaued orders with ties are in P for axes where p is in the leftmost/rightmost
position. However, this is not the case when preferences with ties are single-peaked with outside options or
possibly single-peaked. In Case 1 of the proof of Theorem 1 in the work by Menon and Larson [33], an axis
of pLaLb is used to show NP-hardness for their model.
It is attractive to conjecture that for single-peaked and single-plateaued preferences, the less symmetrical
(with respect to p) the axis is, the easier the complexity of manipulation, but surprisingly this turns out to not
be the case, even for total orders.
For the theorem stated below let m1 and m2 denote the number of candidates to the left and to the right
on the axis with respect to the preferred candidate of the manipulators.
Theorem 11 For single-peaked total orders, single-peaked weak orders, and single-plateaued weak orders,
〈4,3,2,0,0〉 CWCM is in P for m1 = m2 = 2 and NP-complete for m1 = 1 and m2 = 3 for all our scoring rule
extensions.
Proof. m1 = m2 = 2: Careful inspection of the proof of Lemma 6.6 from Brandt et al. [7] proves the
following refined version of that lemma that takes the axis into account.
Lemma 12 Let α = 〈α1,α2, · · · ,αm〉 be a scoring rule. If for all i, j such that 1 < i ≤ m1 + 1 and 1 < j ≤
m2 + 1, it holds that
(α1 −αi)(α1 −α j)≤ (αi −αi+1)(α j −α j+1)
then α-CWCM for single-peaked total orders for this axis is in P.
Note that Lemma 12 applies in our case, since for all i, j such that 1 < i ≤ 3 and 1 < j ≤ 3, the following
hold.
i j (α1 −αi)(α1 −α j) (αi −αi+1)(α j −α j+1)
2 2 (4− 3)(4− 3) = 1 ≤ (3− 2)(3− 2)= 1
2 3 (4− 3)(4− 2) = 2 ≤ (3− 2)(2− 0)= 2
3 2 (4− 2)(4− 3) = 2 ≤ (2− 0)(3− 2)= 2
3 3 (4− 2)(4− 2) = 4 ≤ (2− 0)(2− 0)= 4
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It follows that 〈4,3,2,0,0〉 CWCM is in P for single-peaked total orders when m1 = m2 = 2. It follows
from the arguments in the proof of Theorem 3 that 〈4,3,2,0,0〉 CWCM is also in P for single-peaked and
single-plateaued orders with ties for m1 = m2 = 2.
To get NP-completeness for the single-peaked and single-plateaued weak order cases for all our scoring
rule extensions, we need to modify the proof for single-peaked total orders. Careful inspection of the proof of
Lemma 6.4 from Brandt et al. [7] allows us to extract the following reduction from Partition to 〈4,3,2,0,0〉
CWCM for total orders that are single-peaked with respect to axis a1LpLb1Lb2Lb3.
Given an instance of Partition, a collection of t positive integers k1, . . . ,kt such that ∑ti=1 ki = 2K, we are
asking whether there exists a partition of this collection, i.e., whether there exists a subcollection that sums
to K.
The set S of nonmanipulators consists of
• One weight 20K voter voting: a1 > p > b1 > b2 > b3.
• One weight 8K voter voting: b1 > b2 > b3 > p > a1.
The weights of the manipulators are 4k1,4k2, . . . ,4kt .
If there exists a partition, then let the set T of manipulators vote the following.
• Coalition of weight 4K manipulators vote (p > a1 > b1 > b2 > b3).
• Coalition of weight 4K manipulators vote (p > b1 > b2 > b3 < a1).
Then score(p) = score(a1) = score(b1) = 92K, and the scores of the other candidates are lower. For
the converse, note that the optimal total order votes for the manipulators are (p > a1 > b1 > b2 > b3) and
(p > b1 > b2 > b3 > a1). Simple calculation shows that in order to make p a winner, exactly half of the
manipulator weight needs to vote (p > a1 > b1 > b2 > b3). This corresponds to a partition.
For the single-peaked and single-plateaued cases for votes with ties, note that by Lemma 2, we can assume
that all manipulators rank p uniquely first. We will look at each of our scoring extensions: max, min, average,
and round down.
For max, if the manipulators can make p a winner, we break the ties of the manipulators such that the
resulting votes become total single-peaked orders. p will still be a winner in the resulting election. This
implies that the construction above also gives NP-completeness for single-peaked votes with ties using max.
For round down, the construction above also works. Suppose p can be made a winner. Again, we assume
that all manipulators rank p uniquely first. Now replace all votes with ties (i.e., (p > b1 ∼ a1 > b2 > b3),
(p > b1 > b2 ∼ a1 > b3), and (p > b1 > b2 > b3 ∼ a3)) by (p > b1 > b2 > b3 > a1). Note that score(p)−
score(a1) and score(p)− score(b1) do not decrease, and so p is still a winner of the resulting election, in
which all manipulators vote a single-peaked total order. This implies that the construction above also gives
NP-completeness for single-peaked votes with ties using round down.
For average, the construction above also works, though the proof needs a little more work. Suppose p
can be made a winner. Again, we assume that all manipulators rank p uniquely first. So, score(p) = 92K.
The optimal manipulator votes are: (p > a1 > b1 > b2 > b3), (p > b1 > b2 > b3 > a1), and (p > a1 ∼ b1 >
b2 > b3). Assume that these are the only manipulator votes and let Wa, Wb, and Wab be the total manipulator
weight voting each of these three votes, respectively. Since p is a winner, scoreT (a1)≤ 12K and scoreT (b1)≤
20K. It follows that 3Wa + 2.5Wab ≤ 12K, 2Wa + 3Wb + 2.5Wab ≤ 20K, and Wa +Wb +Wab = 8K. Standard
calculation shows that this implies that Wa = 4K, Wb = 4K and Wab = 0. Thus the weights of the voters voting
(p > a1 > b1 > b2 > b3) correspond to a partition.
For min, the optimal votes for the manipulators are (p > a1 ∼ b1 > b2 > b3) and (p > b1 > b2 > b3 >
a1). In order to make the argument from the total order case work, we need to adjust the weights of the
nonmanipulators a bit. Namely, we let the set S of nonmanipulators consist of
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• One weight 24K voter voting: a1 > p > b1 > b2 > b3.
• One weight 9K voter voting: b1 > b2 > b3 > p > a1.
The weights of the manipulators are unchanged, i.e., 4k1, . . . ,4kt . Note that if half the manipulator weight
votes (p > a1 ∼ b1 > b2 > b3) and remaining manipulators vote (p > b1 > b2 > b3 > a1), then score(p) =
(24 · 3+ 8 · 4)K = 104K, score(a1) = (24 · 4+ 4 · 2)K = 104K, and score(b1) = (24 · 2+ 9 · 4+ 4 · 2+ 4 ·
3)K = (48+ 36+ 8+ 12)K = 104K. The scores of b2 and b3 are lower. Similarly to the previous cases, if
p can be made a winner then standard calculations show that exactly half of the manipulator weight votes
(p > a1 ∼ b1 > b2 > b3), which corresponds to a partition. ❑
5 Related Work
The work by Menon and Larson [33] on the complexity of manipulation and bribery for single-peaked pref-
erences with outside options for top orders is the most closely related to this paper. For manipulation, they
show that for single-peaked preferences with outside options the complexity often increases when moving
from total orders to top orders. They additionally considered a notion of nearly single-peakedness. We instead
study the complexity of weighted manipulation for the standard model of single-peaked preferences with ties
and for single-plateaued preferences with ties.
The focus of our paper is on the computational aspects of models of single-peaked preferences with ties.
These models can also be compared based on which social-choice properties that they have, such as the
guarantee of a weak Condorcet winner. Barbera´ [1] compares such properties of the models of single-peaked,
single-plateaued, and single-peaked with outside options for votes with ties.
Since single-peakedness is a strong restriction on preferences, in real-world scenarios it is likely that
voters may only have nearly single-peaked preferences, where different distance measures to a single-peaked
profile are considered. Both the computational complexity of different manipulative attacks [18, 15] and
detecting when a given profile is nearly single-peaked [14, 8] have been considered.
An important computational problem for single-peakedness is determining the axis given a preference
profile, this is known as its consistency problem. Single-peaked consistency for total orders was first shown
to be in P by Bartholdi and Trick [3]. Doignon and Falmagne [12] and Escoffier, Lang, and ¨Oztu¨rk [16]
independently found faster direct algorithms. Lackner [30] proved that possibly single-peaked consistency
for top orders is in P (and for local weak orders and partial orders is NP-complete), and Fitzsimmons [23]
later showed that single-peaked, single-plateaued, and possibly single-peaked consistency for weak orders is
in P.
6 Conclusions
The standard model of single-peakedness is naturally defined for votes with ties, but different extensions have
been considered. In contrast to recent work that studies the models of possibly single-peaked and single-
peaked preferences with outside options and finds an anomalous increase in complexity compared to the
tie-free case, we find that for scoring rules and other important natural systems, the complexity of weighted
manipulation does not increase when moving from total orders to votes with ties in the standard single-
peaked and in the single-plateaued cases. Single-peaked and single-plateaued preferences for votes with ties
also retain the important social-choice property of the existence of weak Condorcet winners. This is not to
say that possibly single-peaked and single-peaked preferences with outside options are without merit, since
they both model easily understood structure in preferences.
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